Abstract
Competition on distributed generation (DG) investments among multiple stakeholders in a distribution system results in incompleteness of market information, in which each stakeholder does not have full knowledge on investment and operation decisions of other participants. It leads to an incomplete information game among multiple stakeholders. This paper discusses a multi-lateral incomplete information game based approach to study distribution system planning while considering both supply and demand sides competitions. Profit models of three types of stakeholders, including DG investors (i.e., DG units are investor-owned), electricity consumers, and the distribution company, are constructed. The interaction among the stakeholders and their gaming behavior are further studied under the context of multi-lateral incomplete information. Bayesian Nash equilibrium form of the multi-lateral incomplete information game is obtained via Harsanyi transformation. An improved co-evolutionary algorithm is adopted to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 33-bus test system show that, compared with the complete information game method, the proposed approach presents higher expected profits and more accurate planning schemes. Indeed, the proposed approach reflects the realistic planning process of distribution systems under a deregulated competitive environment, and it ensures fairness of competition among self-interested independent stakeholders while guaranteeing their individual performance.
Highlights
The ever-growing electricity market is gradually open for participants in distribution systems [1], [2]
On the supply side, the distributed generation (DG) connected to the distribution system are investor-owned, and their power generation will be consumed by customers in the Distribution Company (DisCo) preferentially [4]–[7]
Where a is DG investor; A is the set of DG investors; xma is a binary variable about DG locations, which is equal to 1 when DG investor a puts DG at bus m, and is 0 otherwise; Nma is total DG capacities of DG investor a connected to bus m; CDaG mean the total profit of DG investor a; CDaG,S, CDaG,C, CDaG,I and CDaG,OM represent the electricity sale income, generation subsidy income, investment cost and operation and maintenance (O&M) cost of DG investor a respectively
Summary
The ever-growing electricity market is gradually open for participants in distribution systems [1], [2]. The weakness of this model is that incomplete information about multiple competitors of the power supply-side is only considered in the upper layer, while optimal strategy determinations of other decision-making participants are presented based on a complete information game. Incomplete information exists among numerous participants in an opening electricity market [34], with multiple competitors of DG investors on the supply side and multiple power retailers on the demand side. This leads to different DRICSs chosen by electricity consumers. A distribution system planning approach is proposed, while considering multi-lateral incomplete information game on both supply and demand sides.
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