Multi-games on interdependent networks and the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

Multi-games have been verified to improve cooperation in social dilemmas, as well as interdependent networks. However, researches on the combination of these two mechanisms are rare. Therefore, we try to introduce mechanism of multi-games on interdependent networks and explore the evolution of cooperation. In our work, the population on both networks is randomly divided into two types, one type players play the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the other type players play Snowdrift. We discover that both the diversity of sucker’s payoff and bias in the utility function can promote cooperation on each network to some extent. In addition, larger magnitude of sucker’s payoff within a certain range could make more cooperation appear on both networks resulting from spatial distribution of strategies. A stronger bias in the utility function could facilitate cooperation on the main network, but restrains cooperation on the other network to a certain degree, which is due to the network reciprocity coming from bias. Besides, on each network, when more players choose to play SD, cooperation on this network can be improved no matter how the other network is classified.