Abstract
The introduction of third-party governance models for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution has promoted the marketization, professionalization, and efficiency of pollution treatment, but also can result in distortions of relevant stakeholder relationships and conflicts of interest. The game relationship among the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies may solve the practical dilemma of comprehensive management of soil heavy metal pollution and establish a good cooperative mechanism. We constructed a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism of each agent’s strategy choice as well as the evolution of each agent’s strategy choice under different parameter trends and simulation analyses. The research showed that the amount of fines and supervision costs, rent-seeking costs and governance costs, and government subsidies and rent-seeking benefits were key factors affecting the evolution and stability strategies of government departments, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies. By cooperating with third-party governance companies, the government can effectively suppress the improper behavior of soil-polluting companies. The conclusions of the study are helpful to broaden the research boundary of soil heavy metal pollution treatment and provide theoretical guidance for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution in China.
Highlights
As rapid industrial development has brought about a jump in gross domestic product, it has caused many environmental problems, among which the problem of heavy metal pollution in soil has attracted much attention [1]
The social benefits of establishing a good image during government supervision Soil-polluting companies strictly abide by the law and the treatment fee stipulated in the contract with the third-party governance company
As a new soil pollution control model, we examined whether a third-party governance company could assist in government regulation
Summary
As rapid industrial development has brought about a jump in gross domestic product, it has caused many environmental problems, among which the problem of heavy metal pollution in soil has attracted much attention [1]. It is necessary to study and formulate relevant incentive and punishment policies to regulate the behavior of the soil-polluting company and third-party governance company, rectify false governance, and effectively improve the level of heavy metal pollution governance. By constructing a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies, we deepened the research on the subject of soil heavy metal pollution control. Based on the evolutionary game perspective, we conducted an evolutionary process for each agent This numerical simulation analysis broadened the research fields and methods of soil pollution control and provided a theoretical basis for improving the effectiveness of policy governance and controlling the risk of soil heavy metal pollution.
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