Métapsychologie et fictions

Abstract

AimsThe purpose of this study is to analyse the limits of representation and the characteristics of fictions in Freudian metapsychology. As such, this paper has an epistemological angle, which looks at the sources and models of fiction in the elaboration of the drive concept. MethodThis article is a theoretical research on fictions and foundations of psychoanalytical concepts, through an epistemological and historical analysis of Freudian metapsychology. The drive theory is located in the process of its construction. ResultsThis study shows that fictions correspond to an heuristic approach to thinking “something unknown”. This article suggests that metapsychological fictions have different modes of existence: “theoretical fictions”, “fundamental concepts”, myths… In this paper, important arguments for mythological fictions are exposed: in the case of death drive, myths may provide a representation of drives and a place for that which escapes the realms of scientific knowledge. DiscussionThe article contains a brief overview of the fictional position in The Interpretation of Dreams. The characterization of “theoretical fictions” is connected with a philosophical field and the principal precursors of Freudian fictionalism: Kant and Hans Vaihinger. An important aspect is to show how metapsychology integrates a philosophical investigation of the possibility for representation. The question of “fundamental concepts” is examined: the focus concerns the notion of “convention” and the significance of “limit-concept”. If the 1915 drive model is clearly scientific and conceptual, Freud's 1920 approach is fundamentally mythological and narrative. This epistemological shift is examined and its significance is discussed. ConclusionThis paper proposes a general conclusion: the Freudian epistemology of fiction is based on an aporia which is present at the core of the possibility of metapsychological representation. From an epistemological point of view, metapsychology formulates and maintains a critical position on the question of “fundamental concepts” and theoretical constructions: this conclusion connects the problem of fictions with the question of belief.