Abstract
We reply to John Duffield's critique of the Rational Design project, a special issue ofInternational Organizationthat explains the features of international institutions from a game-theoretic perspective. The project was deliberately limited to the analysis of explicit and observable institutional arrangements, and focused on the specific institutional properties of centralization, membership, scope, control, and flexibility. Its empirical contribution relies on case studies, but it is significantly amplified by the tight connections provided by a common theoretical perspective that is oriented toward testing a set of specific conjectures about institutional design. The results raise further issues of measurement and cross-case comparisons that provide valuable lessons for future work on institutional design. Although all of these research design choices are worth revisiting and questioning, as Duffield does, the initial results of the Rational Design project show that it provides a good basis from which to explore alternative research design decisions.
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