Moving beyond the moral status of organoid-entities.

Abstract

Ethical deliberations are unfolding for potentially controversial organoid-entities such as brain organoids and embryoids. Much of the ethical deliberation centers on the questionable moral status of such organoid-entities. However, while such work is important and appropriate, ethical deliberations may become too exclusively rooted in moral status and potentially overshadow other relevant moral dilemmas. The ethical discussion on organoid models can benefit from insights brought forth by both Judith Jarvis Thomson and Don Marquis in how they attempted to advance the abortion debate. To discuss other abortion ethical issues more fully, both Thomson and Marquis assumed differing moral status positions of the conceptus and followed lines of reasoning based on these moral status assumptions. We suggest a similar approach with controversial organoid-entities like brain organoids and embryoids. To avoid overshadowing or overlooking other relevant ethical issues, ethicists ought to first assume an organoid-entity moral status position (such as a high moral status or no moral status) and explore any possible arguments that may result from such a position. While we ought not to copy the content of Thomson and Marquis' arguments exactly for organoid-entities, it is worthwhile to translate their arguments' overarching structures. This paper explores the relevant insights of Thomson and Marquis, how they can be translated into the organoid ethics debate, and what possible lines of inquiry may be worth exploring based on particular moral status assumptions.