Motivational internalism and externalism

Abstract

When a person judges that she morally ought to do a certain act, say, drive her friend to the airport, she is ordinarily motivated, at least some extent, to do as she judges that she ought. When she comes to judge that she morally ought to do something else instead, such as drive an injured stranger to the hospital, her motivation ordinarily shifts so that she is motivated, as least to some extent, to perform this act instead of the one she had earlier judged that she should perform. Motivational internalism argues that this rather reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation is conceptual: necessarily, if P judges that she ought to ?, then she is motivated, at least somewhat, to ?. In contrast, motivational externalism argues that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is contingent, arising from some desire of the agent, such as a desire to do the right thing, a desire to promote another’s welfare or some other such desire. This chapter explores the debate between motivational internalism and motivational externalism, explaining the criticisms proponents of each view have raised against the opposing view and the various versions of internalism that have been offered in an effort to meet externalist challenges.