Motivating Solidarity with Distant Others

Abstract

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that although people show considerable concern about the well-being of family, friends, and others close to them, perhaps extending to their own national group, they most often show much less concern for the needs and rights of distant others, for example, those working in sweatshop conditions, or suffering from extreme poverty, or experiencing severe impacts from climate change. This chapter considers the motivation people might have (or might come to have) for taking the needs and rights of these distant others seriously and for standing in solidarity with them. Does this motivation arise from rational reflection on their rights and their equal moral status, as traditionally conceived, or does it require beyond this a disposition to empathy or to care? Drawing on recent philosophical analyses of empathy and on the feminist ethics of care, as well as on the author’s own previous account of transnational solidarities, the chapter analyzes some of the epistemic and motivational aspects of empathy, while also taking note of its potential dangers. It goes on to argue that rational respect can usefully be supplemented with an understanding of the perspective of the other and “feeling with” them and explores some specific ways in which empathizing can transform critical reasoning in global contexts. The chapter’s conclusion suggests some implications of this account for the current issue of how to conceive of the responsibility for fulfilling the requirements of global justice.