Mosul in 1909

Abstract

British consular despatches and reports relating to the provinces of the Ottoman Empire constitute a hitherto little‐used but most valuable source of information about those provinces. For certain places, and on certain subjects, they are indeed sometimes the only source. If we want to know not only what went on, but also what it felt like to live in Baghdad, Basra, Haifa, Tripoli or Aleppo during the obscure years of the last century of Ottoman rule, then we will find these archives indispensable. And of all the consular posts in the Arabic‐speaking provinces of the Empire, those in Mesopotamia—Baghdad, Basra and Mosul—will be found generally to report in the minutest and most meticulous detail. The reason, of course, is not far to seek: Mesopotamia, (i.e. Baghdad, Basra and Mosul), was of particular interest, both political and commercial, to India; and in Baghdad and Basra in particular, British interests were substantial and predominant. In this wealth of documentation, a particular despatch or report sometimes stands out, marked by its brilliance or its solidity, or by being a convenient summary of a subject, the elements of which are scattered and difficult to come by. One such report is the one on Mosul written by Vice‐Consul H. E. Wilkie Young in January 1909, printed below. Both the general paucity of information concerning Mosul during this period, and the shrewdness, the perceptiveness and solidity of the report justify rescuing it from obscurity. What adds to its interest is that it is written between coups d'etat, after July 1908 and before April 1909, when the authority of the state was shaken, and when therefore the notables of Mosul felt free to flex their muscles and advance in self‐government. They in fact did it to such purpose that shortly before the date of this despatch, Mosul was made the scene of a sanguinary riot against Shaykh Sa'id of Sulaymaniyya, who was then visiting the city, and who was murdered with many of his Kurdish entourage. The Vice‐Consul gives a graphic description of the mechanics of such an outbreak: ‘A plan of campaign is arranged at a “mejliss” (assembly) in one of the great houses the night before; and Abu Jassim or some such ruffian is instructed to carry it out, being promised no doubt a new cloak or a few liras for his trouble. Needless to say, neither Ulema nor Notables show themselves when once the mischief has begun. When it is all over, they emerge and go in a body to visit the Vali—or perhaps to the Telegraph Office—with plausible expressions of regret for the occurrence and excuses for the mob, “which”, they say, “is deplorably ignorant and unreasoning and will not be restrained when its feelings are strongly moved”, sic, the fact being that the mob's “feelings” are never moved unless by one of themselves.‘ What adds to the interest of these Notes is that the city they depict is essentially the same as that which, from 1922 to 1925, the British and Faisal their protégé showed themselves so utterly determined to incorporate into Iraq. Young's report thus enables us to appreciate better the society and politics of Mosul in this later period.