Abstract

The Soviet Union’s military-industrial complex — that amorphous, not necessarily homogeneous but nevertheless distinct coalition of political, military, economic, industrial, research and bureaucratic interests whose livelihood derives from defence production and consideration — has much in common with its Western counterparts.1 But whereas those of the Anglo-Saxon world grew apart from the state and remained distinct from the state (though recent decades have seen the emergence of a more intimate relationship), Moscow’s was always part of and integral to the state. Muscovy’s strategic culture, under both Tsars and Commissars, always allowed more military influence over non-military policy considerations and, at the same time, more non-military influence over military matters, strategy and doctrine. The bureaucratic weight of military and related concerns may indeed be greater than that found in the West, but it is qualitatively different: its essence is different, and its implications are different.

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