Moscow and Peking in Post-Indochina Southeast Asia

Abstract

T HE FINAL failure of United States policy in Indochina, and the 1975 Communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, have altered the configuration of international politics in Southeast Asia. America's role and credibility in the area are greatly diminished, and Washington is once again faced with the need to reformulate its goals for the region. Meanwhile, the regional states are intensifying their search for a foreign policy posture that will insure their security in this transitional stage in Southeast Asian and world politics. To be sure, the situation is not wholly new. Many of these trends in US policy and in the behavior of the regional states have been clearly discernible for a number of years.' Washington's role and prestige have been declining for some time, as the war in Indochina dragged on; and the search for a post-Indochina Southeast Asian policy has been going on at least since the initial formulation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. The regional states have been attempting for several years to adjust to the changing environment of world politics-in particular, the changing relations among the major powers, and the resulting impact on Southeast Asia. This has been true especially since 1969 and, in the case of the Philippines, since at least January 1967, when President Marcos called for a more flexible Philippine foreign policy in the face of the inevitable reduction of the American commitment to Asia.2 An important aspect of Southeast Asian politics, which clearly