Abstract
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) provides mortgage forbearance relief to qualifying borrowers, whose loans are placed in a government backed mortgage pool. We analyze the effects of being ineligible for the program by examining the aftermath of the same requirement in the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). Using a comparable sample of borrowers with Freddie Mac loans and privately securitized loans (Bbx) we compare loan performance and quantify potential wealth, consumption, and credit consequences for prime borrowers whose loans were placed in private securitization pools and who were thus ineligible for a government relief program. We show that restricting modification benefits to include only borrowers in federally backed mortgage pools results in significant loss in wealth (through reduced prepayment and increased default) for those otherwise similar borrowers whose loans are placed outside of GSE pools. The greatest detriment is documented in CBSAs with the largest housing price declines.
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