More Than Meets the Eye

Abstract

At first glance, Britain’s decision in 1957 to end conscription appears to be explainable solely by external factors since that change coincided with the decision of Harold Macmillan’s government to bolster its nuclear capability following the embarrassing Suez Crisis. Furthermore, the decision was framed as a cost-cutting move amid budgetary challenges. However, that decision was substantially influenced by the fact that deployment of conscripts was heavily constrained by British domestic politics. Similarly, the merits of conscription for generating a large pool of reservists had limited utility given the political sensitivity of mobilizing reservists. The nature of the domestic constraints—both political and social—on conscription are also evident in the fact that London opted to forego selective service and scrap mandatory military service altogether. This action accelerated British imperial decline after independence was granted to India, which had previously been a sizeable colonial reservoir of British military manpower.