More than agents: Federal bureaucrats as information suppliers in policymaking

Abstract

AbstractBureaucrats are frequently conceptualized as agents of Congress, with much focus placed on their expertise as policy implementers or evaluators. That same expertise, though, allows bureaucrats to supply Congress with information throughout the policy process. Bureaucrats are just one of the many actors that compete to supply Congress with information to define problems and develop solutions. Congressional committees must prioritize all available information, deciding what to attend and what to ignore. I argue that bureaucrats are more likely to testify at hearings when there is (1) limited availability of alternative information sources, (2) the information they hold is necessary for achieving committee goals or tasks (ex. agency oversight), and (3) the information they have can alleviate diverse committee workloads. Using a new dataset of witnesses testifying at congressional committee hearings, I find that the prioritization of bureaucrats as witnesses is explainable in terms of policy area, committee type, and committee agenda.