Morality Reconstructed

Abstract

If morality could plausibly have emerged in the manner described, then various lessons follow for ethics. In moral metaphysics, that ethics presupposes only a naturalistic basis and that the desire to be moral can be associated with the desire to live up to the persona we each project in speaking for ourselves in avowals and pledges. In moral semantics, that ethical judgments may be true or false, and that ethical terms may ascribe bona fide properties, despite having a wholly naturalistic base. In moral epistemology, that our ability to make judgments of desirability and responsibility, as well as other moral judgments, depends on our being immersed in practices like those of avowal and pledging. In moral psychology, that moral judgments are closely tied up with desire and that they are effective in motivating us, not in their own right, but in virtue of the robustly attractive desiderata that they rely on for support. And in moral theory or normative ethics, that it is perfectly understandable why in the ordinary world, moral thinkers should divide on issues like that between consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches.