Morality, Probability, and Risk

Abstract

The possibility of identifying or creating a system of moral requirements that regulates the reaction of society to possible threats is discussed. First, an attempt is made to verify the ability of the basic normative programs of morality to form the basis for such a system. The author argues that the ethics of absolute prohibitions, the ethics of human rights, and the ethics of virtue are faced with insurmountable difficulties. Utilitarianism integrates the probability factor into the logic of making morally significant decisions much more easily, but in this practical context, too, it needs a serious transformation regarding metrics and structure. To denote the result of such a transformation, the author uses the concept introduced by R. Ericson and A. Doyle—“the morality of responsibility and accountability.” Second, the main problems associated with this type of morality are analyzed. It is their solution that completes the image of this normative phenomenon. For the morality of responsibility and accountability to fulfill its role, the following are necessary: (a) to form a type of moral consciousness that would be adapted to the influence of judgments about the probability of certain events on moral assessments, (b) to find the best ways to assign probability indices to future events, (c) to overcome psychological and sociocultural biases regarding the assessment of the probability of events, (d) to establish morally justified discount rates for the future, and (e) to determine the proper reaction of society not only to the risk of threats but also to the uncertainty regarding their likelihood (which allows the selective application of the precautionary principle).