Morality and Self-Interest

Abstract

Kurt Baier's The Rational and the Moral Order, the long-awaited sequel to his The Moral Point of View. Like the earlier work, Baier's new book provides a characterization and defense of morality. It begins with a general account of reason (Chapters 1-2), moves on to a detailed account of practical reason which includes an important distinction between self-anchored (including self-interested) and (including moral) reasons (Chapters 3-4). Morality then characterized and defended as a system of society-anchored reasons (Chapters 5-8). To illustrate its practical utility, Baier then uses his account of morality to answer specific moral questions relating to killing and letting die (Chapter 9). Throughout, the book a treasure trove of philosophical riches that bears reading and re-reading. In his general account of reason, Baier shows how Hume's critique of reason based on the mistaken assumption that reasons can only support by entailing that for which they provide reasons (p. 32ff). Baier argues that there no general requirement that reasons can only support what they entail. For example, that I am taking the cover off my umbrella can be a reason for someone else to conclude that I will take the umbrella with me on my walk even though it does not entail that conclusion. Baier further contends that Hume's rejection of reasoning from is to based on the same mistaken assumption. Thus, that Jones's fingerprints are on the murder weapon can be a reason for concluding that we ought to arrest Jones for the murder without entailing that conclusion. In setting out his account of practical reason, Baier takes up the internalism/externalism debate over practical reasons. Internalism, according to Baier, maintains that a fact a reason for someone to do something, then it necessarily also a motive for him to do it, in the sense that, if he knows or believes that this fact constitutes a reason for him to do something, then it also motivates him [at least somewhat] to do it (pp. 90, 109). Externalism, which Baier accepts, rejects this thesis of internalism.