Morality and Objectivity

Abstract

Absolutism and literal adherence to ethical theories – which have been a major source of the problem of application – have been largely because of the supposition that moral values and moral principles must be objective and absolutely inviolable, not to be affected by peculiarities and perspectives of individuals. The chapter analyses and reconstructs this supposed objectivity required for ethical theories. Alluding to contentions of both Indian and western scholars, this chapter comes up with the theory that objectivity in moral matters is a special sort of objectivity suited to my argument from defeasibility and justified violation. This reveals the significant fact that moral values are objective but defeasible under appropriately demanding situations: they instantiate those important kinds of principles and relations which hold necessarily but, on occasions, are defeasible if a competing value demands preference in the interest of morality. The focus here is to show that our argument from defeasibility and justified violation can help bridging the gap between ethics and its application. This also reveals the crucial trait of rational morality.