Morality and legality in Kant’s ethics

Abstract

Differentiation of morality and legality is one of the fundamental topoi of Kant?s ethics. However, alongside it is often interpreted in too simple (and also sometimes wrong) manner, this differentiation does not demonstrate the whole complexity of Kant?s understanding of moral correctness of certain types of will determination. Thus the goal of this paper is to point out different kinds of morally relevant actions (which are not limited to morality and legality), and then to explain to which extend each of them can be understood as morally correct. For that purpose we will thoroughly consider the issue of determination of will, and then also some of the problematic interpretations of legality and morality, where as a specific issue arises the one of equating morality with autonomy and legality with heteronomy (especially in domestic philosophical works). The issue of different levels of moral correctness of action will also be examined concerning the phenomenon of moral feeling. Particular attention will be given to the role of the kind of action that refer to having direct inclination toward morally correct action, even though it is not directly determined by the moral law. The analysis of these issues brings us to conclusion that legality is satisfied by an action which is outwardly done in a way it would be done by an autonomously determined will. Considering this, the determination of morality precedes the determination of legality. Other way around can be detected only in the process of education.