Moral Value and Moral Obligation

Abstract

This chapter lays out accounts of moral value and moral obligation. According to this chapter, moral value derives from our natural inclinations—from the inner structure of our desires. When we advance our natural inclinations and avoid intentionally frustrating them, and when the positive effects of our actions outweigh their negatives effects, our actions are morally good. But when we intentionally thwart our natural inclinations, or when the non-intended, negative effects of our actions outweigh their positive effects, our actions are morally bad. On this account of moral value, the experience of moral obligation is simply the subjective experience of our unchosen and inescapable inclination toward the universal good. These accounts of moral value and moral obligation provide a basis for analyzing morally ambiguous actions through double effect reasoning, and thus for discussing the ethics of self-sacrifice and the problem of God’s will and Christ’s crucifixion.