Moral Status of Non-human Animals from an African Perspective: In Defense of Moderate Anthropocentric Thinking

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that although African environmental ethics has been considered in some quarter as decisively anthropocentric in orientation, I differ slightly with this common conception and argue that it might be viable to consider it as moderately anthropocentric. I will then proceed to give reasons why I think so. At the same time, I do not intend to portray African environmental ethics as decidedly non-anthropocentric, that is, as moving towards considering non-human animals as morally equal to human beings. This is precisely out of the realisation that such an ideal relation seems not to be the objective of establishing harmonious co-existence between human beings and non-human animals. In defending the moderate anthropocentric view as the character of African environmental thinking, I am trying to suggest how it could be understood differently from its common conception as either decidedly anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric. For reasons of closer familiarity, I will use some examples from Zimbabwean environmental ethical perspective as I seek to defend the position that the moderate anthropocentric view seems to be a viable representation of the relations between human beings and nonhuman animals in African environmental ethics.