Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization

Abstract

Abstract This article discusses the empirical research on implicit bias in the domain of social categorization and the philosophical reflection on what the research tells us about our responsibility for actions influenced or caused by it. It distinguishes reflections (1) on the implicit nature of these biases in relation to the agential control required for moral responsibility; and (2) on the harm implicit biases allegedly do, such as microaggressions, epistemic injustice, shooter bias, and evaluation bias. With respect to (1), it argues that the empirical literature is inconclusive on whether implicit biases undermine backward-looking responsibility. With respect to (2), it argues that our increased knowledge about the harm implicit biases do, understandably inspires forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility. However, it also argues that with respect to the harm implicit biases do, not all harm done is easy address or remedy, for example because not all harm done can be classified as a wrong done by one individual to another. What to do about these harms, is a complex, difficult issue, and an issue on which we might disagree with one another. Ironically, so the chapter points out, if the research on implicit bias is correct, not everyone will be treated as an equal participant in a public discussion of opposing ideas. The chapter concludes that the empirical research on implicit bias is of interest to discussions about moral responsibility and provides us with ample reason to be vigilant with respect to our widespread inclination to categorize one another socially.