Abstract

This chapter explores moral reasoning and argues that it is widely realized, taking place centrally and literally (but not solely) between people. It first provides a sketch of the Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis view of moral reasoning before turning to some important research programs that focus on moral reasoning, focusing on their emphasis—if any—on social interaction. It then examines the views of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg on morality and moral reasoning, Jonathan Haidt’s account of moral reasoning, experimental philosophy as an approach to the study of moral reasoning, moral dumbfounding and its social aspects, and prospects for empirical assessment of the social dependence hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the work of Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder on the folk concept of valuing.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call