Moral Obligation, Religious Demand, and Practical Conflict

Abstract

Abstract Almost all philosophers would concede that conflict among what are often described as prima facie moral obligations is possible and sometimes occurs. The question of whether there can be conflict among what are described, by contrast, as actual moral obligations is vexed. Some philosophers argue that such conflicts do occur, or at least are easily imaginable, and hence are possible. Others argue that such conflicts cannot occur, or at least could not occur from the perspective of an ideally complete and adequate moral theory. The arguments on both sides of the question are impressive. In my opinion, the philosophical contest so far has resulted in a standoff. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that, if such conflicts were to occur, they would be, as usually conceived, internal to the moral realm. In this paper I discuss the possibility that there are conflicts between moral obligations and other practical requirements rooted outside the moral realm altogether. In particular, I intend to take seriously the possibility of conflict between actual moral obligations and the demands of religious living imposed by divine fiat. Many philosophers, myself included, have been tempted to assimilate all such religious demands to moral requirements and for that reason to suppose that a divine command theory might be needed to account for at least part of the moral realm. But I now think that giving in to this temptation is likely to misrepresent, if not mask completely, an important philosophical issue by portraying all possible conflicts between moral obligations and religious demands as internal