Moral objectivity without robust realism

Abstract

In this chapter the author critically evaluates David Enoch's influential argument for an objectivist view of ethics and normativity. For Enoch, there are normative truths that are indispensable for practical deliberation. This critical commitment leads Enoch to accept non-natural moral facts and properties as necessary components of our ontological furniture. While the author accepts Enoch's reasons to reject a metaethics that fails to account for the objectivity of moral practices, based on the work of Derek Parfit, the author argues that there is still a space constituted by normative truths and normative facts that do not have ontological commitment. Moreover, at the end of the day, even though our philosophical discussions presuppose objectivity in morals, this objectivity is compatible with different metaphysical assumptions and with different metaethical theses too. According to the author, the objectivity of morality is not threatened at all by the fact that we continue to argue about whether its foundations are committed to Platonism or to some kind of constructivist or fictionalist approach that seeks to explain them.