Abstract
Certain moral propositions seem intuitively to be necessarily true. We think it would be wrong, other things being equal, to cause someone pain for no reason, to take pleasure in another's pain, to punish those known to be innocent, to taunt the vulnerable. We think it would be wrong to torture a baby to death just for fun. These propositions seem to be necessarily true – in some interesting sense of “necessary.” They seem to be “moral necessities,” as I will say. We do not countenance possible worlds in which they are false – except, perhaps, worlds that are radically different from ours in some crucial respect. We can call the worlds in which we take these propositions to be true the “morally relevant worlds” or “M-worlds” – and we can say that we view the propositions as “M-necessarily” true.
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