Moral licensing, instrumental apology and insincerity aversion: Taking Immanuel Kant to the lab

Elias L Khalil,Nick Feltovich,Pablo Brañas-Garza

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0206878

Abstract

Moral licensing, equivalently called “self-licensing”, is the instrumental use of a Good Act to cover up a Bad Act. This paper’s thesis is that “instrumental apology” i.e., bad-faith apology, is a case of moral licensing. A decision maker may issue an apology (Good Act) after committing a Bad Act, but if the decision maker uses the apology instrumentally, he or she is using the apology to justify the Bad Act. Hence, the apology is insincere. Sincerity is the fine line between a good-faith apology or, more generally, a Good Act, on one hand, and an instrumental apology or, more generally, moral licensing, on the other. In this light, moral licensing should be separated from genuine apology that attains moral equilibrium, which is called in the literature moral “self-regulation’ and “conscience accounting.” According to Kantian ethics, not just the consequences of an act matter, but also the sincerity with which the act was conducted. This pits Kant against the utilitarian view, which downplays intentions and focuses on consequences. We take Kant to the lab. Participants play a modified ultimatum game, where proposers in some treatments have the option of issuing apology messages and responders have both costly and costless options for rewarding or punishing proposers. We introduce different treatments of the apology message to allow responders to form doubts about the sincerity of the apology messages. Our results support the Kantian position: responders, once they become suspicious of the sincerity of the proposers’ apology, exhibit “insincerity aversion” and punish proposers.

Highlights

In The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice, Christopher Hitchens [1] criticizes Mother Teresa for accepting gifts from disgraced bankers, such as Charles Keating, and ruthless dictators, such as the ex-ruler of Haiti, Jean-Claude Duvalier
We can draw general observations concerning the above set of statements: 1. While the time sequence of the Good Act and the Bad Act is irrelevant for moral licensing, the Good Act must follow the Bad Act for moral equilibrium—i.e., to restore one’s moral standing through genuine remorse or apology
In the cases of Keating and Duvalier, Hitchens is leveling Statement 1a, while Mother Teresa is asserting Statement 2a. Both implicitly subscribe to the proposed definition that sums up the above set of statements: A Good Act stops being about moral equilibrium and becomes moral licensing once the agent uses it instrumentally/insincerely, i.e., for a purpose other than the act’s stated or implied purpose

Summary

Introduction

In The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice, Christopher Hitchens [1] criticizes Mother Teresa for accepting gifts from disgraced bankers, such as Charles Keating, and ruthless dictators, such as the ex-ruler of Haiti, Jean-Claude Duvalier. While the time sequence of the Good Act and the Bad Act is irrelevant for moral licensing, the Good Act must follow the Bad Act for moral equilibrium—i.e., to restore one’s moral standing through genuine remorse or apology This characterization of moral equilibrium is consistent with how Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Espinosa, and Garcıa [4] define moral equilibrium, which they call “moral cleansing”: “immoral behaviour has a negative effect on moral self-worth. In the cases of Keating and Duvalier, Hitchens is leveling Statement 1a, while Mother Teresa is asserting Statement 2a Both implicitly subscribe to the proposed definition that sums up the above set of statements: A Good Act stops being about moral equilibrium and becomes moral licensing once the agent uses it instrumentally/insincerely, i.e., for a purpose other than the act’s stated or implied purpose. This tendency is probably the outcome of the fact that spectators need to make a binary decision: they must either judge an act as aimed at moral equilibrium or reject it as moral licensing

Review of the literature

Experimental procedures

Results

Result

Conclusion