Moral Law and Moral Education: Defending Kantian Autonomy

Abstract

In this paper, I examine why Kantian ethics has had such a hard time of it. I look at readings of Kant’s moral theory that have had great force in the 20th century and conclude that these have much to do with an ensuing confusion, which has led to charges of rigidity, formality and severity. Then I demonstrate that when we make moral judgements we rely heavily on the stock of rules, norms, duties and laws that is extant in our social life. We use these as frames that are already influential in the role and scope of our anticipated moral action. We deliberate primarily by forming a maxim (principle) that must have the consent of all. We do so only occasionally, as the existing stock of rules is already in operation, helping us to reject out-of-hand outlandish or egregious maxims. Finally, I discuss, in very cursory form, some educational approaches based on this way of conceiving Kantian moral theory. Universalistic moral strategies have a tough time of it right now. Utilitarianism has long passed its point of popularity. Kantian moral theory has fared somewhat better in philosophical and political circles, but poorly in educational ones. There are a number of reasons, I believe, why this is so. First, Kantian moral theory appears excessively formalistic or rule-bound. It seems to reduce to the command: ‘do your duties’. As such, it is unlikely to be popular with teachers and academics that prize flexibility and case-based ethical judgment. Second, it seems to leave no room for consequences. ‘What happens if I act according to duty? Perhaps something terrible will happen to someone. However, this cannot be my problem once I have done my duty, for I have done my duty, after all, and I should not then worry about the consequences of my acts.’ Third, it seems impossibly difficult to follow. I must surrender all of my motives to the arbiter of duty and can act only on those that have ‘moral worth’. Few if any could be expected to follow such a harsh and demanding moral regimen. Fourth, it seems to be built on a now-discredited metaphysics, one that privileges reason and rationality to the detriment of all else. This metaphysics is subjective, individualist, and uncompromising. We live in a post-metaphysical age so why should we adopt a metaphysical theory of morals?