Abstract
Abstract This chapter explores a number of philosophical issues raised by the possibility of arriving at moral views by relying on other people. I defend the Moral Inheritance View, according to which a person whose earliest moral views are inherited from her social environment might very well have substantial moral knowledge even before she is in a position to begin critically reflecting upon or reasoning about those views. More generally, I argue that other people are in principle potentially rich sources of moral knowledge. To the extent that we have reservations about the propriety of forming moral views by relying on others—as opposed to through the exercise of our own autonomous judgment—what is legitimate in those reservations does not derive from its being impossible to acquire moral knowledge in this way, but rather from other sources.
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