Moral Judgments

Abstract

Abstract As shown in the first chapter, all previous accounts of moral judgments are inadequate because they provide no clear distinction between moral and nonmoral judgments. These linguistic or metaethical accounts are unable to provide a clear distinction because they are primarily theories about the purposes of making moral judgments, not about the content of these judgments.1 The various linguistic theories of moral judgments are thus not mistaken accounts of the nature of moral judgments, rather they are accounts of the way that many judgments, including moral judgments are used. Since nonmoral judgments, such as financial and prudential judgments, have many of the same functions as moral judgments, what the various linguistic accounts say about moral judgments applies equally well to many kinds of nonmoral judgments. Thus, all of these theories have something of value to say about the functions and purposes of making moral judgments, even if they do not distinguish moral judgments from nonmoral judgments.