Abstract
This paper investigates the role of common-knowledge in the principal-agent model under uncertainty. We treat the problem: How epistemic conditions will be able to settle a moral hazard in team in the principal-agent model under uncertainty. We shall propose a resolution programme for the moral hazard in the principal-agent model by common-knowledge. Let us assume that the agents have the knowledge structure induced from a binary relation associated with the multi-modal logic S5n or S4n. We show that the moral hazard can be resolved in the principal-agent model under uncertainty if the agents commonly know all their own costs.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
