Abstract
Helping individuals to buy insurance coverage in developing countries, for instance by allowing them to buy insurance on credit, may induce more risky behavior. Using rich administrative data on auto-insurance market in Ghana, and a policy reform that led to sizable reduction in demand by disallowing individuals to buy insurance on credit, I provide non-parametric evidence for the existence of moral hazard and recover lower bounds on the costs it imposes in this market. The estimated cost of moral hazard reach 12% of firm profits. The results have important implications for the study of market inter-linkages, bundling and credit-constraints.
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