Abstract

We have argued for an urgent need for moral bioenhancement; that human moral psychology is limited in its ability to address current existential threats due to the evolutionary function of morality to maximize cooperation in small groups.We address here Powell and Buchanan's novel objection that there is an ‘inclusivist anomaly’: humans have the capacity to care beyond in‐groups. They propose that ‘exclusivist’ (group‐based) morality is sensitive to environmental cues that historically indicated out‐group threat. When this is not present, we are inclusivist. They conclude that moral bioenhancement is unnecessary or less effective than socio‐cultural interventions.We argue that Powell and Buchanan underestimate the hard‐wiring features of moral psychology; their appeal to adaptively plastic, conditionally expressed responses accounts for only a fragment of our moral psychology. In addition to restrictions on our altruistic concern that their account addresses – such as racism and sexism – there are ones it is ill‐suited to address: that our concern is stronger for kin and friends and for concrete individuals rather than for statistical lives; also our bias towards the near future. Hard‐wired features of our moral psychology that are not clearly restrictions in altruistic concern also include reciprocity, tit‐for‐tat, and others. Biomedical means are not the only, and maybe not the most important, means of moral enhancement. Socio‐cultural means are of great importance and there are currently no biomedical interventions for many hard‐wired features. Nevertheless research is desirable because the influence of these features is greater than our critics think.

Highlights

  • In a series of papers[1] and a book[2] we have argued that there is an urgent need to pursue research into the1 I

  • We have argued for an urgent need for moral bioenhancement; that human moral psychology is limited in its ability to address current existential threats due to the evolutionary function of morality to maximize cooperation in small groups

  • We argue that Powell and Buchanan underestimate the hard-wiring features of moral psychology; their appeal to adaptively plastic, conditionally expressed responses accounts for only a fragment of our moral psychology

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

This proposal has met with widespread opposition,[3] even from those who enthusiastically embrace biomedical enhancement of other human capacities than moral ones.[4] We have responded to many of these criticisms.[5] In a recent provocative and erudite argument, Russell Powell and Allen Buchanan raise a new kind of challenge.[6] They correctly point out that we believe that cultural forms of moral enhancement (e.g. moral education) have been only moderately effective and are not up to the task of mitigating major anthropogenic harms and existential risks.[7] But, they argue, we have seriously underestimated the power of such means of moral enhancement, and the amount of moral progress that the human species has achieved by their means They hypothesize that it is socio-cultural, not biomedical, means of moral enhancement that offer the best prospect for addressing the problems humans currently face. They accuse us of having exaggerated the constraints that evolution has placed on moral progress. Socio-cultural innovations that alleviate infectious disease, resource scarcity, physical insecurity, interethnic conflict and low rates of productivity suffice to foster inclusive morality.[11]

THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DISPUTE
Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu
Findings
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Full Text
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