Moral Folkism and the Deflation of (Lots of) Normative and Metaethics

Abstract

In this paper, I do two things. First, I argue for a metaethical view that I call moral folkism. The two main subtheses of moral folkism are as follows: (A) if there are any wrong-like properties, then there’s a vast plurality of them; e.g., there’s a property of Kant-wrongness, and Mill-wrongness, and Moore-wrongness, and so on; and (B) which of these properties count as genuine kinds of wrongness (i.e., real moral wrongness)—if any of them do—is determined by facts about us, in particular, our usage, intentions, and practices concerning moral words. Second, I discuss the consequences of moral folkism. In particular, I argue that (i) moral folkism leads us to the deflationary conclusion that many of the normative and metaethical questions that philosophers discuss are settled by empirical facts about what ordinary folk happen to mean by their words—and so they’re not settled by mind-independent facts about reality. In addition, I also argue that (ii) moral folkism does not imply that applied ethical questions are settled by facts about folk meaning, and (iii) moral folkism does not imply moral anti-realism (i.e., moral folkism is perfectly compatible with a robust sort of moral realism).