Moral Fictionalism, Preference Moralization and Anti-Conservatism: Why Metaethical Error Theory Doesn't Imply Policy Quietism

Abstract

The evolutionary explanation of human dispositions to prosocial behaviour and to moralization of such behaviour undermines the moral realist's belief in objective moral facts that hold independently of people's contingent desires. At the same time, advocacy of preferences for radical large-scale policy change is generally sure to be ineffective unless it is moralized. It may seem that this requires the economist who would advocate loud policies, but is also committed to a naturalistic account of human social and cognitive behaviour, to engage in wilful manipulation, morally hectoring people even when she knows that her doing so ought rationally to carry no persuasive force. Understanding the role of moralized preferences in the maintenance of the self, and in turn understanding the economic rationale of such self-maintenance, shows how and why preferences can be moralized by a believer in error theory without this implying hypocrisy or manipulation.