Abstract
In the course of decentralization, pastoral communities in Namibia have had to find new ways to share their most salient resource, water, and the costs involved in providing it. Using data from sixty communities, we examine (1) whether and to what extent different sharing rules emerge, (2) how variations can be explained, (3) how rules are perceived and influence success, and (4) what economic consequences they have. Our results reveal that either all members pay the same (numerical equality) or payment is according to usage (proportional equality). We find that although proportional equality provides more success, the rule can only pertain where the state maintains an active role. Simulations show that where it does not prevail, wealth inequality is likely to grow. These findings have political implications and suggest that, in the context of the widespread decentralization policies, the state should not withdraw if it aims to ensure the success of common-pool resource management and to fight poverty.
Highlights
As the impact of humans on communal resources grows, there is an increasing need to better understand how resources can be governed sustainably
A ‘Handbook for Water Point Committees’ was developed and distributed to the NGO and state representatives administering the process on the local level (Namibia 2006)
The correlation between different indicators of satisfaction and the rule type indicates that communities with proportional equality are more satisfied that is more successful
Summary
As the impact of humans on communal resources grows, there is an increasing need to better understand how resources can be governed sustainably. Elinor Ostrom has identified eight principles that explain failure and success in shared communal resource management. While the significance of some of the original variables (e.g., monitoring, sanctioning) has been explored to some extent during the last decades (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001, 2003; Dietz et al 2003; Anderies et al 2004; Pagdee et al 2006; Ostrom 2009; Cox et al 2010; Poteete et al 2010; Yang et al 2013), comparably little is known about the efficacy of different cost- and benefit-sharing agreements (principle two in Ostrom’s list). Nation states have increasingly withdrawn from local resource governance. Legislation and post-Rio policies in the global South support community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) approaches, putting questions of best practices center stage (Brosius et al 1998; Leach et al 1999; Ribot 1999; Cleaver 2012; Hall et al 2014; Cleaver and de Koning 2015)
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