Moral Enhancement, Neuroessentialism, and Moral Content

Abstract

The conceptualization of morality by some proponents of moral bioenhancement requires particular epistemological commitments and neuroessentialist assumptions. This chapter examines these assumptions and shows why such premises are problematic for the development of a sophisticated framework of morality at the intersection of neuroscience and moral philosophy and why these premises cannot support the possibility of moral enhancement. The author provides conceptual clarity on key concepts in the moral enhancement debate, including the distinction between psychopharmacology and neurotechnologies as means to cognitive enhancement, the meaning of moral enhancement, and the crucial distinction between moral capacity and moral content. Second, he critiques neuroessentialism, pointing to a danger to reduce human behavior to neurobiology and the potential to misconceptualize human moral psychology. Third, he expands his critique of neuroessentialism, particularly with regard to the concept of moral agency and offers a viable alternative based on social practices.