Moral emotions, conscience, and cognitive dissonance

Abstract

Tikhomirov's and his colleagues' works revealed complicated emotional regulation of the performance of intellectual tasks (Tikhomirov, 1984). This regulation seems to be in the field of the self-correction of transgressions. Despite the improvement of technological resources in contemporary human society, the amount of intolerance, discrimination, and violence has not diminished. More conservative people see the solution of these problems in the development of the penitentiary system, from sanctions imposed on parents to criminal sanctions. Liberally oriented people see the solution in the humanization of family and school upbringing. In turn, good nurturance and upbringing can be viewed as successful only if people are able to autonomously correct their mistakes and improve their bjehavior. This ability essentially is described as conscience.The American Psychological Association's definition of conscience is individual's sense of right and wrong. In psychoanalysis, conscience is the SUPE- REGO, or ethical component of personality, which acts as judge and critic of one's actions and attitudes (APA Dictionary of Psychology, 2007, p. 218). Changing ethical to inner and adding the estimation of other persons' actions, we can get a balanced definition of conscience: an inner component of personality that acts as judge and critic of one's own and others' actions according to one's values. This definition is in agreement with Freud's and Allport's descriptions (Allport, 1955; Freud, 1923/1968). In contemporary psychology the closest construct to conscience seems to be self-control of social behavior. Its function is signaling an important discrepancy or a gap between our social behavior, on the one hand, and our values, goals, and beliefs, on the other. According to psychoanalytical and socio-cultural approaches, this self-control grows through the internalization of social (first of all, parents') control (Freud, 1923/1968; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1984).However, how can we be sure that twinges of conscience or the feeling of remorse really exist? Sometimes self-reports represent desired rather than real experience and feeling. Given the essence of self-control, we can expect that the coherence of our social behavior with our aspirations and expectations leads to a feeling of pride, while incoherence leads to feelings of shame and guilt. Many studies in the field show that the most reliable expressions of twinges of conscience are moral emotions, especially shame and guilt (Barret, 1995; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1999). Some authors consider twinges of conscience to be an obligatory element of guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011). The common reason for both these emotions is the discrepancy (cognitive dissonance) between one's actual behavior (or unjustified lack of activity) and the wish to conform to one's desired self-image and values. The subject of these emotions can be not only oneself but any member of one's group (from a relative to a compatriot).The differences between shame and guilt should be discussed. Shame is ex- pressed clearly: flushed face, ears, and neck; averted or sunken head; closed face or eyes; interrupted communication; avoidance of the witnesses of a transgression. Guilt is not expressed so obviously. Shame is impossible without a real or imagined audience that is critical of the agent of a transgression. One is shamed or blamed by somebody in one's consciousness. Guilt is more oriented toward the victim of a transgression but not to betrayals. A person who has guilt feelings cares not about an observer's assessment of the deed but about the consequences of the transgression. In the case of my wrongdoing the cognitive content of shame is focused mainly on my own self (I am bad) but the cognitive content of guilt is differentiated from myself and is focused on my particular actions only (I was wrong in this situation) (Tangney, 1995). …