Abstract
Abstract This article proposes to reconceive moral education on the model of spiritual practice. Such an education would be defined not by its content—that is, explicit instruction about moral rules or particular virtues—but rather by the form of its constituent activities. Drawing on the works of both Plato and Foucault, the article addresses questions about the epistemic complexity of virtue raised in Mark E. Jonas and Yoshiaka Nakzawa’s A Platonic Theory of Moral Education. It then goes on to suggest that the form of spiritual practice is uniquely suited to the cultivation of virtue understood on their Platonic model.
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