‘Moral dumbfounding’: Moral Foundations Theory for the classroom

Glenn Y Bezalel

doi:10.1177/1477878520934014

Abstract

There has been a growing literature among philosophers of education on how to frame questions of moral controversy in the classroom. Through the application of hard moral cases that may be said to leave one ‘morally dumbfounded’, I take up Michael Hand’s influential epistemic criterion and attempt to show why its monistic approach is too limited in its ability to capture the complexity of such moral dilemmas. Rather, I argue that the classroom requires a pluralist moral framework, as exemplified by the Moral Foundations Theory, developed by Jonathan Haidt. Not only does Moral Foundations Theory consider the liberal ethic of autonomy, it also extends consideration to the ethics of community and divinity, which is crucial for meeting the broader aims of moral and religious education, such as developing reason, identity and cultural understanding.

Highlights

In the best tradition of the Talmud, it may be said that ‘hard cases make good law’
This article seeks to take up Michael Hand’s (2007) influential championing of the epistemic criterion ‘for distinguishing the moral questions we should teach as controversial issues from those we should not’ and show, through the use of hard moral dilemmas, that the criterion falls short
Understanding one another may be hard; it can certainly be interesting. It doesn’t require that we come to agreement. (p. 78). It is in this spirit of understanding and empathy that Stonewall, the LGBT-rights charity, has ‘welcomed the proposal to study two religions’, in the new Religious Studies GCSE curriculum, ‘which they noted should ‘help students better understand different philosophical and ethical arguments and their impact and influence in the modern world’’

Summary

Introduction

In the best tradition of the Talmud, it may be said that ‘hard cases make good law’. Infamous for its theoretical legal dilemmas, the Talmud is replete with strange and bizarre problems that are taken just as seriously as practical law. Such epistemic reasoning may in the end justify our duty towards treating the dead body with dignity, such arguments surely don’t get to grips with the universal sense, as expressed by Claire in Carver’s story, that such a duty – even towards strangers – seems self-evident.

Results

Conclusion