Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought from Gratian to Aquinas. By M.V.Dougherty. (Cambridge UP, 2011. Pp. x + 226. Price £55.00, $90.00.)

Abstract

The topic of moral dilemmas – situations ‘in which an agent cannot fulfil all impending moral obligations’ (p. 3) – is a central issue in modern philosophical ethics. But it was subject of significant discussion in the Middle Ages, too, under the general description of moral ‘perplexity’. An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting against an obligation. Moral perplexity might come in various shapes and forms: perplexity secundum quid (‘an individual experiencing a conflict of obligations arising from the prior commission of some morally impermissible action’ (p. 115)), and perplexity simpliciter (‘an individual experiencing a conflict of obligations given no prior misdeed’ (p. 115)); and of the former of these, perplexity such that the ‘bad effects of the prior misdeed can. .. be defused’ (p. 142), and perplexity such that it cannot be. And included among ‘prior misdeeds’ are the dictates of an erroneous conscience. Perplexity in all of these forms is distinct from mere epistemic confusion – merely being unsure about how to behave. Dougherty includes in‐depth chapters on Gratian (the canon lawyer), the early thirteenth‐century theologians William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Capreol, and very brief discussions of the main thinkers between Aquinas and Ockham – thus extending well beyond the scope suggested in his title.