Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues: A Kantian Perspective

Abstract

Abstract No one, I suspect, accepts everything that Kant said about moral matters, but many remain hopeful that Kant’s ideas, suitably modified and supplemented, might be developed into an ethical theory that meets most familiar objections and remains worthy of serious consideration. The project of developing such a Kantian theory, however, faces formidable obstacles. Prominent among these are problems concerning conflicts of duty. Alan Donagan has addressed at length the most familiar problem of this sort: the charge that Kantian principles generate unresolvable moral dilemmas. Although correct and important in its main thesis, I think that Donagan’s defense of a Kantian position concedes too much in one way and too little in another. Moreover, the objection to which Donagan responds is not the only problem Kantians must face regarding moral conflicts.