Abstract
Background: Recent neuroscience investigations on moral judgment have provided useful information about how brain processes such complex decision making. All these studies carried out so far were fMRI investigations and therefore were constrained by the poor temporal resolution of this technique. Recent advances in electroencephalography (EEG) analysis provided by Low Resolution Tomogray (Loreta), Principal Component (PCA), Correlation and Regression Analysis improved EEG spatial resolution and made EEG a very useful technique in decision-making studies. Methods: Here, we reinvestigate previous fMRI study of personal (PD) and impersonal (ID) moral dilemma judgment, taking profit of these new EEG analysis improvements. Results: PCA analysis disclosed three different patterns of brain activity associated with dilemma judgment. These patterns are proposed to disclose the neural circuits involved in benefit and risk evaluation, calculating intention to act and controlling decision-making. Regression analysis showed that activity at some cortical areas favors action implementation by increasing intention to act, while activity at some other areas opposes it by decreasing intention to act. Comparison with Existing Methods: Compared to the previous fMRI results, Loreta and PCA revealed a much greater number of cortical areas involved in dilemma judgment, whose temporal and spatial distribution were different for ID compared to PD. The present paper suggests that whenever final temporal details of the decision making process are desired, EEG becomes the tool of choice as compared with fMRI. Conclusions: The presented results are discussed from the utilitarian point of view that proposes adequacy of human action being dependent upon how much pleasure and fear/pain they are associated.
Highlights
IntroductionRecent development of new techniques for studying the human brain has brought moral and ethical discussions to the realm of neuroscience investigations [1,2,3,4].Greene et al [2] were among the first to use fMRI to study moral dilemma judgment and in other two papers [3,4] they explore the cerebral areas involved in judgment of personal (PD) and impersonal (ID) like the trolley dilemma (as ID example) and the foot bridge dilemma (as PD example): The trolley dilemma: (D) A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. (A) The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. (J) Is it appropriate to switch the tracks?The foot bridge dilemma: (D) Similar to the trolley dilemma, the trolley is on a path that will kill five people. (A) The five people could be saved if you push a stranger in front of the trolley; the stranger would be killed. (J) Is it appropriate to push the stranger?Such dilemmas have the following structure: proposition D describes a situation that implies a social loss (dead) of a given value (5 people); proposition A describes an action to avoid the social loss but at a personal risk of a given intensity (hitting a switch or pushing a stranger), and a question (J) asks the individual to decide whether A is appropriate in the context introduced by D
Greene et al [2] were among the first to use fMRI to study moral dilemma judgment and in other two papers [3,4] they explore the cerebral areas involved in judgment of personal (PD) and impersonal (ID) like the trolley dilemma and the foot bridge dilemma: The trolley dilemma: (D) A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. (A) The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. (J) Is it appropriate to switch the tracks?
If the above hypotheses are validated, 4) dilemma judgment has to be the result of the enrollment of many different neural circuits in charge to evaluate benefits and risks associated with D and A and using these evaluations to calculate the adequacy of action proposed in A as its solution and the willingness of implementing this action
Summary
Recent development of new techniques for studying the human brain has brought moral and ethical discussions to the realm of neuroscience investigations [1,2,3,4].Greene et al [2] were among the first to use fMRI to study moral dilemma judgment and in other two papers [3,4] they explore the cerebral areas involved in judgment of personal (PD) and impersonal (ID) like the trolley dilemma (as ID example) and the foot bridge dilemma (as PD example): The trolley dilemma: (D) A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. (A) The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. (J) Is it appropriate to switch the tracks?The foot bridge dilemma: (D) Similar to the trolley dilemma, the trolley is on a path that will kill five people. (A) The five people could be saved if you push a stranger in front of the trolley; the stranger would be killed. (J) Is it appropriate to push the stranger?Such dilemmas have the following structure: proposition D describes a situation that implies a social loss (dead) of a given value (5 people); proposition A describes an action to avoid the social loss but at a personal risk of a given intensity (hitting a switch or pushing a stranger), and a question (J) asks the individual to decide whether A is appropriate in the context introduced by D. As a matter of fact, only recently Shenhav and Greene [4] used regression analysis to correlate activity in previously chosen regions of interest and regressors like intended moral value [4] that is to study the dependence of dilemma judgment upon the expected benefit but not risk. This is in contrast with the concept of utility of an action as defined by Bentham [5], who was among the first to propose the theory of utilitarianism. Conclusions: The presented results are discussed from the utilitarian point of view that proposes adequacy of human action being dependent upon how much pleasure and fear/pain they are associated
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