Moral Conflict and Its Structure

Abstract

Abstract It is commonly thought that there might be conflicts of obligations or moral dilemmas and that their existence would have serious implications for moral theory, metaethics, or deontic logic. Some alleged implications of moral dilemmas depend upon their frequency. On one such view, the fact that moral dilemmas are so common places severe constraints on the prospects for a systematic moral theory and on the possibility of moral knowledge. But a more common view is that something about the structure of a moral dilemma generates troublesome or paradoxical implications. On this view, the important question is whether there are or could be any moral dilemmas; their frequency is of little or, at most, secondary importance. Indeed, if we understand ‘moral dilemmas’ univocally in both contexts, then the question of their existence must be prior to the question of their frequency. In any case, I shall focus on this second, structural issue. Before we debate whether there are moral dilemmas, we need to know what sort of conflict is necessary to produce trouble or paradox in ethical theory. In fact, it will be useful to reserve the expression ‘moral dilemma’ as a term of art that refers to conflicts with such consequences. When the nature of these conflicts and their consequences are clear, we can ask whether it is reasonable to suppose that there arc moral dilemmas.