Abstract
In this chapter, I examine the discussion around the rational and moral basis for legal categories in postclassical Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī legal theory. The debate was pushed forward by the Akhbārī movement in the 17th century CE; they proposed a novel position concerning the rational basis for the law in which reason can determine certain moral aspects of an action (e.g., a good action can be recognised by reason, and its performance attracts praise), but not legal elements (e.g., that the performance of a good action deserves a reward beyond praise). This leaves, for them, the Lawgiver (that is, God) to connect the moral aspects of an act with its legal consequences (that is punishment for a morally bad action and reward for a morally good action); that causal connection cannot be made by reason alone. Based on these findings, I conclude that Akhbārī moral theory, often read along literalist lines, showcases an adherence to the Muʿtazilī-derived framework common to the Imāmī Twelver Shīʿī theology and law generally, whilst also reserving ultimate legal authority to God.
Highlights
The five-fold system of Islamic legal classification lays out the requirements placed on the individual by the ultimate Lawgiver
The debate was pushed forward by the Akhbārī movement in the 17th century CE; they proposed a novel position concerning the rational basis for the law in which reason can determine certain moral aspects of an action, but not legal elements
The Akhbārī refusal to allow a necessary connection between rational moral assessments and scriptural legal classifications appears, on an initial reading, quite Asharī in tone
Summary
The five-fold system of Islamic legal classification (al-aḥkām al-khamsa) lays out the requirements placed on the individual by the ultimate Lawgiver (al-shāri, that is, God). The early Mutazilī position consisted of two elements: (1) ontology (the independent and external nature of moral assessments) and (2) the functioning of reason (i.e., the ability of reason to recognise and identify these external characteristics) These two elements proved, in time, to be attractive to a number of theological schools beyond the Mutazila proper, with these Mutazilī-derived ideas influencing other theological trends. I argue in this chapter that this is an inaccurate portrayal, and I base my conclusions on my analysis of the Akhbārī position of the relationship between moral (rational) assessments and legal (revelation-based) categorisations On this issue (and many others, it could be added), the Akhbārīs propose a variant of the Mutazilī-style argumentation which Twelver Shīī scholars had taken and made their own in the years after the full-blown adoption of Mutazilism (MADELUNG 2008).
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
