Abstract
In this paper, I introduce a puzzle about moral assertion and defend a solution that centrally features the claim that the normativity of moral assertion centrally features moral understanding.
Highlights
What we have here is a default case of testimony: A approaches you and tells you a humdrum truth. It is a default case of knowledge transmission via testimony, or so we may at any rate assume
While in the non-moral case, it is perfectly fine to assert your testimonial belief to B in the way you do, the same does not hold for the moral case
In much the same way as for non-moral assertion, we get (i) an evaluative norm of assertion according to which a good moral assertion is one that has the disposition to generate understanding in hearers when functioning normally in normal conditions; and (ii) prescriptive norms for various parts of the simple economic system (SES) of producing and consuming moral assertions according to which moral assertions function as they ought if and only if they are functioning normally
Summary
The results that we get are (i) an evaluative norm according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers when functioning normally in normal conditions; and (ii) prescriptive norms according to which various parts of the SES of producing and consuming assertions function as they ought if and only if they are functioning normally. This is because it is plausible that, in case of explained moral assertion, hearers do respond with belief, offering the desired return that will motivate speakers to continue to produce moral assertions.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
