Moral absolutism and abortion: Alan Donagan on the hysterectomy and craniotomy cases.

Abstract

Reynolds argues that the nonconsequentialist moral theory proposed by Alan Donagan in his book The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press; 1977) does not resolve the cases in which craniotomy or removal of a cancerous uterus appears necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman. Donagan's absolute prohibition against the murder of the innocent and his rejection of the principle of double effect have led him to view the fetus as a pursuer or assailant or to assert the theory of proleptic agreement--that in risk taking ventures the parties may agree that killing one person to save the lives of the others will be accepted. Reynolds holds these arguments to be inapplicable in therapeutic abortions involving craniotomy or hysterectomy and concludes that Donagan's absolutist theory must be reexamined.