Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal

Abstract

ABSTRACT We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A , assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establish or indicate that it is true that one is intentionally doing A . In this paper, I argue against this assumption, showing how it entails being in a Moore-paradoxical situation. I argue that if knowledge of intentionally doing A were such that grounds for it must be truth-indicating, then one could always wonder, when doing A , whether A is for one a goal. However, just as wondering whether p is true is incompatible with thinking that one believes p , so wondering whether A is for one a goal is incompatible with thinking that one is intentionally doing A . We must allow, then, that one’s knowledge of intentionally doing A is itself a representation of A as a goal to be accomplished, apt to be grounded by reasons for doing A . I show that the first-personal character of knowledge of acting intentionally resides in its being practical rather than theoretical.