Mood Propensity as a Constituent of Happiness: A Rejoinder to Hill

Abstract

In an earlier paper I defended an emotional state theory of happiness. In a basic form, emotional state theories identify happiness with a person’s moods and emotions. To this formulation I added a second component, “mood propensity”: roughly, an individual’s disposition to experience moods, which can vary with the circumstances. Scott Hill argues that this view is vulnerable to a serious counterexample and that my intuitive arguments for it are unconvincing. This paper extends my earlier defense of mood propensity as an aspect of happiness, in the process replying to Hill’s objections. I argue that the intuitive considerations favoring my view are not weakened by the points Hill raises. Moreover, the inclusion of dispositional elements in a theory of happiness is actually quite common, and there are good substantive, and not just intuitive, reasons for incorporating mood propensity in the account. In particular, it seems to be required by the guiding conception of happiness as a matter of a person’s overall emotional condition.