Monte carlo sampling and regret minimization for equilibrium computation and decision-making in large extensive form games

Abstract

In this thesis, we investigate the problem of decision-making in large two-player zero-sum games using Monte Carlo sampling and regret minimization methods. We demonstrate four major contributions. The first is Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MC-CFR): a generic family of sample-based algorithms that compute near-optimal equilibrium strategies. Secondly, we develop a theory for applying counterfactual regret minimization to a generic subset of imperfect recall games as well as a lossy abstraction mechanism for reducing the size of very large games. Thirdly, we describe Monte Carlo Minimax Search (MCMS): an adversarial search algorithm based on *-Minimax that uses sparse sampling. We then present variance reduction techniques that can be used in these settings, with a focused application to Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). We thoroughly evaluate our algorithms in practice using several different domains and sampling strategies.